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Abstract
Governance—the way rules are set and implemented—in many institutions is sustained
through the service of groups of individuals, performing low-promotability tasks. For
instance, the success of not-for-profit professional societies, civic organizations, and
public universities depends on the willingness of members and employees to serve in
governance. Typically service is requested by annual calls to serve. We implement and
analyze a field experiment at a large public university using a randomized experimental
design, to investigate whether responses to calls to serve are affected by revealing a
department’s service rankings among its peer departments. We find that revealing
a service ranking in the lowest quartile leads to significantly higher response rates
than disclosing a median and higher-than-median ranking. Second, beyond informing
department heads of their departments’ service rank, directly informing individual
faculty members does not have an additional effect on response rates. Third, we show
that the treatment effects in the lowest serving quartile are driven by female faculty
responses, even though female faculty members were no more likely than their male
peers to respond to serve before the experiment. If taking on such tasks is detrimental
to promotion, while important for the overall institution, this has implications for
the faculty careers of women and men. Given our data we cannot identify potential
mechanisms behind the results; formally testing these mechanisms is an area for future
research.
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1 Introduction
The principle of shared governance, while contributing to the excellence of many pub-
lic universities, depends on the alacrity of faculty members to exercise it. By serving on
academic senate committees, individual faculty members dedicate time to participate in the
way rules are decided and implemented, and consequently benefit from having a voice in
discussions affecting their lives as teachers, researchers, and employees. At the department
level, a department can have its interests represented by having a large share of its faculty
serving on committees. However, faculty may have reasons not to serve. Due to the oppor-
tunity cost of time, faculty may prefer that service be completed by someone else, especially
if the task is seen as having little effect on their evaluation and career advancement. For
instance, research-related tasks may be viewed as more promotable than service-related tasks
in research-oriented universities (Babcock et al., 2017). Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that
despite the reasons to serve, calls to serve on academic senate committees have low response
rates.1
This paper investigates whether providing information to departments about their ser-
vice ranking—in terms of previous service on academic senate committees relative to peer
departments of the same size—changes individual faculty members’ probability to answer
calls to serve on future senate committees. We also investigate whether informing faculty
directly about their department’s service rankings (in a bottom-up fashion) instead of only
1This paper explores a university setting where the baseline response rate to academic senate service calls is
8.5% while a response rate of at least 18% is required to fill all positions. At a different public university,
Babcock et al. (2017) find a volunteer response rate of 3.7% to academic senate service calls.
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informing department heads (in a top-down fashion) leads to different responses rates. Fi-
nally, we examine whether the peer comparison treatments differentially affect the response
rates of female faculty relative to their male peers.
Our experimental design is as follows. For the 64 departments and schools in our sample,
we divide departments into four size quartiles. Given data on faculty senate service in the
previous year, we compute the rates of service by department as well as each department’s
service ranking within its size quartile. We then randomly assign half of departments in
each size quartile into treatment and control groups. The departments in the control group
receive the standard call-to-serve reminder email, sent to department chairs or school deans
every year, requesting them to forward the email to their faculty members. Clicking on
the link provided in the email leads to an online form for indicating willingness to serve
on a committee in the next year.2 The treatment group receives the same direct or chair
email reminder, but additionally, the departments in this group receive information on their
department’s service ranking among all departments of a similar size.
We collect two years of data on faculty responses to the call-to-serve email—from before
and after the experiment—in order to estimate the effect of the information treatment on
individual voluntary service responses. The highest serving departments in each size group
are not treated due to institutional restrictions imposed at the time of the design. This
leaves us with 24 treated and 24 control departments, comparable in size and service, and
16 very high service departments that receive the control email but are not used to identify
the treatment effects. As an orthogonal sub-treatment to the overall experimental design,
2The online form also asks you to rank which committees you would like to serve on. The form does not
provide a way to indicate you are not interested in serving; thus all that reply are interested in serving.
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all faculty in a subset of treated and control departments receive the same call-to-serve
email directly, and at the same time as their chair. In this sub-treatment, we aim to assess
whether, by informing faculty directly of their department’s relative ranking, this bottom-
up information approach leads to different response rates as to when the chair receives the
information and forwards it to their faculty in a top-down manner. This sub-treatment is
also motivated by the fact that we cannot directly verify whether chairs forward the email
to all of their faculty, even though the email explicitly asks them to do so.
Changing behavior due to learning the behavior of others is consistent with four distinct
hypotheses (Ayres et al., 2013). First, learning that peer departments provide less (more)
service could increase (decrease) feelings of guilt and lead to more (less) service in the
future. Alternatively, learning the behavior of peers might provide information about the
possibility of alternative time use choices of the faculty body and the relative benefits of those
choices. Third, information about the volunteer rates of others may also allow individuals
to update their beliefs about the equilibria being played and about the pivotality of their
individual decision to volunteer. Fourth, learning how your department ranks compared to
peer department may also reveal (or make salient) that your behavior is being observed and
scrutinized by the university (i.e., big brother is watching), leading to a Hawthorne effect.
Like other peer information studies, an important limitation of our experiment is that we
are not able to distinguish between social learning, conditional cooperation, equilibrium
selection, and observability theories of behavioral change. For instance, if faculty members
react to information that their department is serving more than their peers’ by decreasing
their own service, this change might be caused either by decreased guilt (i.e., conditional
cooperation), or by making a Bayesian inference about being free-ridden by others and
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missing out on research time (i.e., social learning and equilibrium selection). It also could
be due to faculty believing this is the response desired by the university (i.e., Hawthorne
effect). Another limitation of our design is that, when the call-to-serve emails go to the
chair, we can not disentangle whether the treatment effect is driven by the behavior of the
chair or the behavior of the individual faculty. For instance, a chair that receives a treatment
email may change how they ask their faculty to serve. While we attempt to address this
concern by sending call-to-serve emails directly to faculty, we are cautious in interpreting
the mechanisms behind our results for this reason.
Finally, using characteristics of individual faculty, we investigate treatment effect hetero-
geneity by the gender of the faculty member and by whether the faculty member replied to
the call-to-serve email in the previous year. Recent research identified gender differences in
the probability of taking on service tasks with low promotability (Babcock et al. 2017; Bab-
cock, Recalde, and Vesterlund 2017), finding that women are both more likely to volunteer
to serve than men and are more likely to be asked to serve than men. Thus, if the treatment
effect is driven by the behavior of chairs, chairs that learn their department is low performing
may be more likely to ask women, as well as those that have served in the past, to serve
in the future. Croson and Gneezy (2009) review the experimental evidence on preference
differences between genders and find that women are neither more nor less socially oriented,
but that social preferences of women are more situationally specific and malleable than those
of men. Thus, if the treatment effect is driven by the behavior of individual faculty, women
may be more likely than men to shift their preferences for voluntary service when provided
with new information. Unfortunately, for the same reasons as above, we will not be able to
disentangle these mechanisms.
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Our findings are as follows. The average probability of replying to the call-to-serve
email is greater with the treatment email relative to the standard control email, but not
significantly. The average probability of replying also did not change significantly when
faculty were directly sent the treatment email. When we go beyond the average effects and
investigate heterogeneity of responses by service quartile disclosed in the treatment email,
we find interesting and statistically significant results. First, the probability of responding
to the call-to-serve increased the most for individuals in departments who received an email
disclosing they were in the lowest service quartile. Second, in terms of gender differences, we
find the treatment effects by service quartile are larger for female faculty. This is particularly
interesting since, in our sample, female faculty were no more likely than their male peers to
respond to the call-to-serve before the information intervention. We also find larger treatment
effects for those who responded to the call-to-serve in the previous year. Thus while social
comparisons increase the service response rate of the lowest serving departments, this finding
is driven by the responses of female faculty and faculty already engaged in service.
While we are not able to explain why this happens, our results highlight the power of
peer comparisons to influence service rates for non-promotability tasks, especially among
those revealed to be behind their peers. Existing research has empirically established a
link between social comparisons and other pro-social behaviors, including home electricity
use (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2013), restaurant hygiene (Jin and Leslie, 2003), pollution
emissions (Blackman et al., 2004), charitable giving (Frey and Meier, 2004; Smith et al.,
2015), voter turnout (Gerber and Rogers, 2009), and towel reuse by hotel guests (Goldstein
et al., 2008).3 Our paper relates most closely to studies that examine heterogeneity in
3For reviews of the psychology literature on social influence and pro-social behavior, see Cialdini and Goldstein
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treatment effects depending on where individuals fall in the behavior distribution. Allcott
(2011) shows that by providing feedback to customers on home electricity usage relative to
their neighbors, utilities can reduce energy consumption at a low cost. Moreover, the author
finds heterogeneous treatment effects—households revealed to be in the highest decile of
pre-treatment consumption decrease usage by 6.3%, while those revealed to be in the lowest
decile decrease consumption by only 0.3%. In a university setting, Card et al. (2012) find
that revealing the salary of peers causes university workers with salaries below the median for
their pay unit and occupation to report lower job satisfaction, while those earning above the
median report no higher satisfaction. Similar to these studies, we find little to no treatment
effect for faculty in departments revealed to be just above/below median with respect to
previous service participation, and a large treatment effect for faculty in departments revealed
to be in the lowest service quartile.
Our paper also adds to the growing literature on gender differences in the allocation
of time spent on low-promotability tasks. Survey evidence from academia has shown that
female faculty, relative to their male peers, spend fewer hours in research, more time advising
undergraduate students, and more time serving on department and college-level committees
(Misra et al., 2012; Mitchell and Hesli, 2013; Porter, 2007). While these findings suggest
gender differences in the likelihood of accepting requests to do low-promotability tasks, these
survey data cannot rule out the possibility that assignments differ because of differences in
the frequency with which men and women are asked to serve voluntarily. This is a concern
in our setting as well, where we cannot confirm if chairs forward emails to (or discuss service
responsibilities with) their department members differentially by gender. Our study attempts
(2004); Penner et al. (2005).
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to address the concern that all faculty might not be asked equally by sending the call-to-
serve email directly to all faculty members in a subset of departments, regardless of gender
and rank. Moreover, by using administrative service and response data, we also avoid the
systematic under/over reporting and recall bias of survey data.
Finally, this paper relates closely with the work of Babcock et al. (2017) and Babcock,
Recalde, and Vesterlund (2017). Using controlled laboratory settings, these studies show
that women are both more likely to volunteer for low-promotability tasks than men and
more likely to be asked to volunteer for these tasks than men. In addition to the lab
experiments, Babcock et al. (2017) examine university service data similar to the data used
in this study. They test whether women in another large, public U.S. university are less able
to say “no” than men to calls (sent via email) to serve on a faculty senate committee. These
call-to-serve emails are sent directly to all faculty—an important contrast to our setting
where the call-to-serve emails are sent to department chairs (except for the sub-treatment
with direct faculty emails). We replicate the Babcock et al. (2017) analysis on our pre-
experiment response data and with the post-experiment response data from the direct email
treatment. While Babcock et al. (2017) find that female faculty are significantly more likely
than male faculty to volunteer to be on a committee and to serve on committees, we find
no difference in response and service rates between men and women in the pre-experiment
(chair-only) sample or in the experimental direct-email sample. Babcock et al. (2017) state,
“What is not clear from these field data is why women are more likely than men to accept
such requests.” We echo this and add, it is also not clear why women at one university
would be more likely than men to accept service requests but not at another university. Our
findings suggest that institutional norms (i.e., how faculty believe service will affect their
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promotion), the information departments (both chairs and faculty) have about their service
relative to their peers’ service, and how faculty are asked to volunteer could explain some
of the gender differences in performing low-promotability tasks, and consequently, could be
an important component in the career trajectory of women relative to men. To draw more
general conclusions about whether and why female faculty are more likely to volunteer for
low-promotability service, systematic data collection and analysis are needed on call-to-serve
response rates at other institutions. One limitation of our study is that we cannot pinpoint
why women respond differently than men to the treatment, or in other words, we cannot
identify the mechanism behind the gender difference, as it can be due to differences in pro-
social behavior by women relative to men, differences in being asked to serve, and finally,
differences in being able to say no when asked.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and experimental design and
section 3 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results, including average
and heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 5 concludes and discusses avenues for future
research.
2 Experimental Design and Data
2.1 Data Sources
The first dataset we use consists of a faculty census for each department and school in a
large, public university in the U.S., for the academic year 2013-14. The raw data for these
administrative records consist of 1,719 observations, each with a faculty identifier, depart-
ment affiliation(s), the academic title (assistant, associate, etc.), and a job-code. Several
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job-codes in a particular school were not actual faculty senate positions, so these 109 ob-
servations were dropped. There are 69 departments in the raw data, however, five of these
departments mostly teach undergraduate students in interdisciplinary units and do not have
a core faculty body or chair. These departments are also dropped from the analysis. As a
result of these criteria, we have a final roster of 1,501 faculty belonging to 64 departments.
The second dataset we use originates from public records and consists of the aggregate
number of faculty serving in the senate for each department and year from 2005 to 2014.
The third dataset is a list of all faculty that served on committees in 2013-14, which is
matched to the faculty census. The fourth and final dataset consists of the individual faculty
responses to the call-to-serve email for 2013-14 (before the treatment) and for 2014-15 (after
the treatment). Every year call-to-serve emails are sent to department heads, requesting
them to forward the email to their faculty. In 2013-14, the response rate to the call-to-serve
email was 8.5% while a response rate of at least 18% was required to fill all positions. When
there are not enough volunteers from the call-to-serve email, faculty that served in the past
are asked to serve again. The necessity of relying on the same volunteers over and over and
not having enough new volunteers was a concern for the academic senate and a motivating
factor behind permitting this study.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the number of faculty members by department
in 2013-14, as well as on the number of service eligible faculty members by department. The
service eligible pool consists of faculty of associate title or higher, as assistant professors
are discouraged from serving on committees and, consequently, only associate professors
or higher typically serve.4 The departments in this institution are quite heterogeneous in
4Of the 211 assistant professors in our sample, only 5 responded to the 2013-14 call-to-serve email and only
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their faculty size.5 We divide the departments into size quartiles based on the number of
service eligible faculty. The smallest quartile (labeled Size Q1, henceforth) consists of 13
departments with 7.5 or less service eligible faculty. The second quartile in terms of size
(Size Q2 ) has 19 departments with 7.5 to 12 faculty members that are eligible for service.
The next quartile (Size Q3 ) has 15 departments with the number of eligible faculty ranging
from 12 to 24.5. Finally, the largest quartile (Size Q4 ) has the remaining 17 departments
and these are departments that are quite large, with up to 72.5 faculty members in the
eligible service pool.
Given the above datasets, we compute the percentage of eligible faculty that served in
2013-14 for each department. Table 1 provides a breakdown of service participation summary
statistics by department size quartile in 2013-14. Average service eligible participation ranges
from 22% to 33% across the size quartiles and median service eligible participation ranges
from 17% to 32%. Size Q1 has the lowest median participation at 17%. This would be
consistent with faculty in very small departments being already fully involved in internal
departmental level service, with little time to participate in additional campus level service.
Moreover, the smaller departments (Size Q1 and Q2 ) have the largest maximum department
service participation of 75%. This is not surprising given faculty size can be as low as 2.5 in
Size Q1, and therefore if one of those few faculty is involved in service, the resulting service
4 served on academic senate committees in 2013-14.
5In the raw data, several faculty had multiple affiliations; that is, they were listed as belonging to multiple
departments. In order to compute the total number of faculty in each department, a faculty member was
counted as 1n of a faculty member in each of their n departments of affiliation. Thus, if a faculty member
was listed as having two affiliations (which happened in 73 cases), those faculty received a 12 count in each
department.
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participation rate is quite high. This is why it is important to analyze and compare service
participation rates among departments of similar size. And we do this by randomly revealing
to departments their service rankings within each column, not across columns.
2.2 Experimental Design
Within each department size quartile (Size Q1-Q4 ), we divide departments into four service
quartiles based on their eligible service participation rate in 2013-14: Serve Q1 ≤ 25th
percentile in terms of service; Serve Q2 = 26-50th service percentile; Serve Q3 = 51-75th
service percentile; and Serve Q4 ≥ 76th service percentile. Next, within each department
size quartile, we randomly assign departments into treatment and control groups.6 We do
not assign treatment to any departments in Serve Q4 due to institutional restrictions. In
the original research design, Serve Q4 departments also were assigned into treatment and
control groups, to test whether disclosing high service would encourage or discourage future
service responses. Both conditional cooperation and social learning mechanisms predict a
“descriptive norm boomerang effect”—departments with high pre-treatment service should
decrease service, while those with low pre-treatment service should increase service (Allcott,
2011). However, we did not find institutional support from the data source to implement
this additional analysis. We opted to follow their recommendation, given their willingness to
share these unique data made this study possible in the first place. We therefore only make
an experimental intervention on the three lowest service quartiles and leave the call-to-serve
email to Serve Q4 departments unchanged. Table 2 presents the number of departments in
6The randomization is not stratified on service quartile.
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each size quartile cross-tabulated with each service quartile and treatment group.7
The control department chairs receive a standard call-to-serve email from the chair of the
committee that recruits service on campus. This email is similar to the call-to-serve email
they receive every year and asks chairs to forward the email to their faculty. The treated
department chairs receive the same email but with additional information on where their
department ranks in terms of service. In particular, the treated email reveals the quartile of
the department in terms of service participation among departments of similar size (i.e., in
the same size quartile). Given that we do not treat the highest service quartile departments,
the tone of both the treatment and control emails encourages departments to improve their
participation rate in the future. Finally, we randomly select a subset of treated and control
departments to which we send emails directly to the faculty in addition to the emails sent
to their chair.
The standard email sent to the chairs each year starts with “Dear Chair, We would like
to thank your department for its ongoing participation in the activities of the [University’s]
Academic Senate.”8 The email goes on to discuss several reasons why it is in the interest
of the faculty members to undertake Academic Senate service. The email concludes with,
“Please forward this message to your faculty to encourage them to submit their committee
preferences directly. They can sign up by following this link.” In the treatment email, we
add an additional line saying, “After reviewing the service participation data for 64 campus
7For Size Q1, nearly half of the departments had zero service participation. Instead of grouping some of these
zero service departments into Serve Q1 and some into Serve Q2, we put all of them in Serve Q1, which
means there are no Size Q1 departments in Serve Q2.
8Redacted versions of the call-to-serve emails are presented in the appendix.
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units, we have noted that your department is when compared to other units of similar
size.” The blank space varies according to the service quartile of each department, between,
“in the bottom 25%”, “below the median (in the 25%-50% range)”, and “above the median
(in the 50%-75% range)”. Finally, all faculty in a random subset of treated and control
departments receive the same call-to-serve email directly, and at the same time as their
chair. In this sub-treatment, we wish to assess whether a bottom-up information approach
leads to different response rates than the university’s usual top-down approach.
We have two testable hypotheses from this experimental design. First, we expect larger
treatment effects (i.e., increases in response rates) for those revealed to be in the lowest
performing departments versus those revealed to be in median performing departments. This
hypothesis is consistent with several mechanisms—conditional cooperation, social learning,
equilibrium selection, and observability effects—however, our experimental design is unable
to distinguish between these mechanisms. Second, if a stronger signal comes from direct
emails versus emails forwarded from a department chair—either because the chair does not
forward the email or because a forwarded email seems less important—we would expect larger
treatment effects for those that get direct emails than for those that get emails forwarded
from their chair. Conversely, if receiving a direct email sends a weaker signal than one from
a department chair—perhaps because the recipient does not personally know the sender or
because direct emails from the faculty senate got lost among the plethora of university emails
received—we would expect larger treatment effects for those that get emails from the chair.
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2.3 Concerns for Interpretation
An important concern when interpreting the results of our experiment is whether chairs
actually forward the call-to-serve emails. Even though the email explicitly asks chairs to
forward the email to their department, we cannot verify that chairs do so, just as we cannot
verify that faculty read their emails. If we find a treatment effect, it could be that chairs
are more likely to forward the email to their faculty when they receive a treatment email. In
other words, the treatment effect we estimate could have more to do with how the treatment
influences chairs rather than the general population of faculty members.
In order to address this concern, we implement a follow-up survey of the 64 chairs in
our sample.9 When asked how they forwarded call-to-serve emails inviting volunteers for
academic senate service each year, 67% of chairs respond that they forward the emails
to all faculty in their department, 13% respond that they never forward the emails, and
13% respond that they selectively forward emails depending on the service availability and
likelihood to serve of their faculty. When asked how their department decides who volunteers
to serve on academic senate committees each year, a vast majority of chairs (83%) respond
that their faculty individually decide whether or not to serve. Importantly, the proportion of
these responses does not differ by whether the chair was in a treated or control department.10
While this survey captures stated behaviors and not actual behaviors, we find the responses
reassuring in that most chairs are not deciding to how many (and which) faculty members
to forward the email and “volunteer.”
9We received responses from 30 chairs, a response rate of 48%.
10One third of both treated and control chairs in Serve Q1 report selectively forwarding emails to their faculty.
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2.4 Balance in Pre-Treatment Observables for Treated and Control Departments
To validate this empirical design, it is important to investigate whether the control and
treatment groups are indeed comparable in attributes—with respect to the number of faculty,
the number of departments, and average service in the pre-period. Table 3 presents the
summary statistics of observable characteristics for the entire sample of departments (column
1) and by service quartile (columns 2–5). Additionally, Table 3 breaks down the summary
statistics by treatment and sub-treatment groups (columns 6–9). To make visual comparison
easier, bold text in columns 2–4 indicates the average for Serve Q1, Q2, or Q3 is statistically
different (with a p-value ≤ 0.05) from the average for Serve Q4 (column 5). Bold text in
columns 6 and 8 indicates the average for the treated departments is statistically different
(with a p-value ≤ 0.05) from the average for the corresponding control departments in
columns 7 and 9. In total, there are 24 treated departments with 557 faculty, 24 control
departments with 572 faculty, and 16 Serve Q4 departments with 375 faculty members. With
respect to the sub-treatment, 6 of the treated department and 6 of the control departments
were randomly selected to receive direct faculty emails.
Considering the whole sample, the average department has approximately 23 faculty—a
third of which are female—a response rate to the pre-treatment call-to-serve email of 9%,
and an Academic Senate service rate of 18%. While the female share of faculty increases
with service quartile from 31% in Serve Q1 to 39% in Serve Q4—suggesting higher serving
departments have a higher share of women, these averages are not statistically different from
each other. As expected by design, call-to-serve response rates and service rates in 2013-14
increase with service quartile. The response rates are 3%, 8%, 12%, and 13% for Serve Q1,
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Q2, Q3, and Q4 respectively, and the corresponding service rates are 7%, 19%, 20%, and
27%.
In terms of pre-existing trends in service participation since 2005, service in Serve Q1
departments had been declining by 2 percentage point per year while service rates in the
other three quartiles had been constant or increasing over the same time.11 Turning to the
treatment groups, it is reassuring to find almost no statistically significant differences between
treated and control departments.12 The notable exception is that the control departments in
the direct email sub-treatment have a higher service rate in 2013-14 than the corresponding
treated departments.
To investigate pre-existing trends in the percentage of women in the department faculty,
we use data on the number of women and the total number of faculty by department from
2008 to 2014, to construct the percentage women by department by year. We see in the
last row that the percentage of women had been overall constant, given the non-significant
estimated linear trend coefficient, as well as constant for all quartiles and when broken down
by control and treated departments.
Of particular note, when we examine the service rates across gender, we find no sta-
tistically significant difference between women and men in 2013-14. This is true across all
columns (i.e., for the whole sample and all quartile and treatment groups). Conversely,
when we compare service rates within gender, women in Serve Q4 serve at a higher rate
than women in Serve Q1, Q2, and Q3, though not significantly so for Serve Q2, whereas
11The average trend in service participation is calculated using the dataset, from public records, consisting of
the aggregate number of faculty serving in the academic senate for each department and year from 2005–2014.
12This is particularly reassuring given we did not stratify the randomization on service quartile.
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men in Serve Q4 serve at a significantly higher rate than men in Serve Q1, but not men
in Serve Q2 and Q3. These summary statistics provide weak evidence that being a high
service department is correlated with having a higher share of women and a higher share of
women serving. In other words, the service rankings revealed to departments may be more
correlated with the service rates of women than men.
In summary, Table 3 shows that treated and control departments are well balanced with
respect to observable characteristics and pre-trends in service, and percentage of women in
their faculty, lending validity to our randomization and experimental design. Furthermore,
on average we cannot conclude that women serve at a higher rate than men in our baseline
year.
2.5 Post-Treatment Call-to-Serve Response Rates
A total of 233 responses were obtained for the 2014-15 call-to-serve emails. Compared to
the previous year’s 127 responses, the response rate increased by 83%.13 The top panel of
Table 4 breaks up responses and non-responses by treatment group. We include all ranks of
faculty in this table, given that we care about willingness to respond to the call-to-serve, not
whether a faculty member can actually serve.14 The total number of faculty that did and did
not respond are reported separately for both treated and control departments whose chair
received the call-to-serve email (titled “Chair Only Email”) and departments whose faculty
directly received the call-to-serve email (titled “Direct Faculty Email”). The control rows
13While the aggregate data on department service goes back to 2005, we only have 2013-14 and 2014-15
response data at the individual faculty level.
14The institution discourages assistant professors from serving until tenure, which means only associate pro-
fessors or higher can serve.
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exclude observations originating from the Serve Q4 departments. We find that the treated
Chair Only Email group had a response rate of 16% while the corresponding control group
had a response rate of 13%. In terms of the Direct Faculty Email, the response rate for the
treated group is 23% and the response rate for the control group is 19%. Thus a preliminary
look at the response data suggests receiving a treatment email leads to higher response rates.
The bottom panels of Table 4 report heterogeneity in response rates for treated and con-
trol faculty by their departments’ 2013-14 service quartile, by their gender, and by whether
faculty members replied to the call-to-serve email in the previous year. For Serve Q1, the
treated group response rate is twice as large as the response rate of the control group (19%
versus 9%). Conversely, for Serve Q2 and Serve Q3, the response rates for the treated
groups are smaller than the corresponding control groups. Both treated men and women
have higher response rates than their control counterparts—the share of men responding is
4 percentage points higher in treated departments than control departments and the share
of women responding is 1 percentage point higher. Control faculty members that responded
in 2013-14 have a much higher response rate in 2014-15 than those that did not previously
respond (51% vs 11%) and these rates are slightly greater for the corresponding treated
faculty (53% vs 14%).
A visual depiction of the call-to-serve replies by department given replies in the previous
year is presented in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis, we have the share of faculty by
department responding to the call in 2013-14, and on the vertical axis, the share of faculty
by department responding to the call in 2014-15. Each circle is a department with the size
of the circle corresponding to the size of the department. In panel (a), we have the control
departments depicted in blue, and in panel (b), the treated departments are depicted in
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red. The circles above the 45-degree line are departments where there was an increase in
responses relative to the previous year. In panel (a), we see most control departments are
near the 45-degree line, indicating response rates did not change much from the previous
year. Conversely, in panel (b) the treated departments are dispersed farther above the 45-
degree line than the control departments, suggesting the treatment email had a positive
average effect on responding to the call-to-serve.
Finally, Figure 2 compares the response and service rates pre- and post-treatment, for
all departments and by service quartile. Panel (a) reveals the share of faculty responding
to the call-to-serve email increased post-treatment for all departments, and especially for
the departments that were the lowest serving pre-treatment. Moreover, the response rates
for 2014-15 are nearly equal across service quartiles, averaging 16%. This is much closer
to the 18% response rate needed to fill all committee positions in the academic senate
than the average in 2013-14. Panel (b) shows that while the average service rate across
all departments does not change post-treatment, the share of faculty serving from Serve Q1
increases while the share serving in Serve Q4 decreases post-treatment. This is consistent
with the treatment redistributing the service load from the high to low serving departments
through who responds to the call-to-serve. In summary, the above tables and figures provide
initial evidence that the social comparison treatment altered the distribution of departments




The probability of responding to the 2014-15 call-to-serve among faculty in our 2×2 treat-
ment design is modeled as:
Rfd = α0 + γ1Treatd + γ2DirectEmaild + γ3Treatd ×DirectEmaild +Xβ + fd(1)
where Rfd is a response indicator equal to 1 if faculty member f from department d responds
to the 2014-15 call-to-serve, and equal to 0 otherwise. Coefficient α0 captures the average
response rate without either treatment. The coefficients of interest with respect to the
experiment are those associated with the variables Treatd, DirectEmaild, and Treatd ×
DirectEmaild. In particular, the coefficient γ1 corresponds to the average change in the
response rate from call-to-serve emails with the peer comparison treatment. The coefficient
γ2 corresponds to the average change in the response rate from additional call-to-serve emails
sent directly to faculty. Finally, the coefficient γ3 corresponds to the average change in
the response rate from peer comparison emails sent directly to faculty. The matrix X
is a set of control variables, which include indicator variables corresponding to the size
quartile of department d (SizeQd), indicator variables corresponding to the service quartile
of department d among its peers of similar size (ServeQd), and all the interactions of SizeQd
and ServeQd. We estimate equation 1 using both a linear probability model and a Probit
model.
In addition to estimating average treatment effects, we fully interact equation 1 with
the ServeQd indicator variables in order to compute heterogeneity in treatment responses
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based on the service quartile revealed in the treatment email. We also investigate response
heterogeneity by the gender of the faculty member and by whether the faculty member
replied to the call-to-serve email in the previous year. We do this by estimating our preferred
specification on the corresponding sub-samples of faculty members.
4 Results
4.1 Average Peer Comparison Treatment Effects and Heterogeneity by Service Quartile
While the above summary statistics are illuminating, we pursue a more formal analysis of the
call-to-serve response rate changes caused by the different treatments. Table 5 reports the
average treatment effects (columns 1–4), as well as the heterogeneous treatment effects by
service quartile groups (columns 5–6), using specifications of equation 1. The odd numbered
columns report the estimates from a linear regression, while the even numbered columns re-
port the estimates from a Probit regression. The dependent variable in all columns is equal
to one if the faculty member responded to the call-to-serve in 2014-15 and equal to zero
otherwise. We include a set of indicator variables for the size quartile of the faculty mem-
ber’s department—Size Q1 is the omitted reference size quartile—and a set of indicators
for the service quartile of the faculty member’s department—Serve Q1 is the omitted refer-
ence service quartile—as well as their interactions. Faculty members in the highest serving
pre-treatment departments (Serve Q4 ) are omitted from this analysis. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the department level.
Starting with the average effects in columns 1–4, while the Treat and Treat × Direct
coefficients are all positive—which means on average the treatment emails increase the prob-
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ability of faculty responding relative to the control emails—these estimates are not statisti-
cally different from zero. Furthermore, receiving a direct email, regardless if it is a control
or treatment email, does not increase the probability of responding on average, as shown
by the positive yet insignificant coefficients for Direct Email in columns 3 and 4. Thus, we
cannot conclude direct emails are more or less effective than emails to the chair. This null
result could reflect the signal from chair emails being stronger in some cases and weaker in
other cases, depending on the (unobserved) way in which chairs choose to forward emails. If
some chair emails are effective while others are not, they may cancel each other.
Moving now to the heterogeneous treatment effects in columns 5 and 6, breaking up the
effects by the service quartile yields more nuanced results. The treatment effect for the lowest
service quartile (Serve Q1 ) is positive and statistically significant, which can be seen by the
coefficients on Treat in columns 5–6 (since Serve Q1 is the omitted service quartile indicator).
This means that the probability that faculty belonging to departments in the lowest service
quartile respond to the call-to-serve increases when their chair receives a treatment email
disclosing their low service rank. Conversely, the treatment email has a slightly negative
effect for departments in the middle service quartiles, as shown by the coefficients on Treat
× Serve Q2 and Treat × Serve Q3, which are negative, significant, and larger in magnitude
than the coefficients on Treat.
In summary, we find that the effect of revealing quartile rank is non-linear, with faculty
in the lowest service quartile increasing their response rate with treatment and faculty in the
middle service quartiles decreasing their response rate with treatment. Also, we do not find
that sending direct emails to faculty increases the response rate on average or heterogeneously
by service quartile.
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4.2 Gender Differences in Peer Comparison Treatment Effects
Next, we examine gender differences in the treatment effects using the four model specifica-
tions shown in Table 6. Column 1 replicates the OLS specification from column 5 of Table 5
with the addition of an indicator variable Male, equal to 1 if faculty member f is male.
Columns 2 and 3 estimate the model separately for the 801 male faculty and the 325 female
faculty. Lastly, column 4 fully interacts the model in column 1 with the indicator for Male,
in order to test whether the gender differences found in column 2 and 3 are statistically
significant.
We find several interesting results comparing men and women. First, simply controlling
for gender reveals no differences in male and female response rates on average (column 1).
Second, the treatment effect for faculty in Serve Q1 is larger for women. In column 3,
treated women in Serve Q1 were 15.41 percentage points more likely to respond to the
call-to-serve than control women in Serve Q1. While men in Serve Q1 also have a positive
coefficient on Treat (column 2), it is smaller in magnitude than the coefficient for women
(0.1018 vs 0.1541) and it is not statistically different than zero, even though the sample size
of men is more than double that of women. However, even though it appears the women are
driving the treatment effect in Serve Q1, the fully interacted model in column 4 reveals that
the 5 percentage point difference in treatment effects between genders is not statistically
significant, due to the noisier estimate for men. Similarly, the treatment effect in Serve Q2
is larger for women than men, but this difference is not statistically significant (column 4).
On the other hand, column 4 shows that without treatment, men are more likely to respond
than women to serve in Serve Q1 (with a positive and significant coefficient on Male).
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The third result of interest is that the treatment effect for faculty in Serve Q3 is larger
for men than women, with a negative and significant coefficient in the row labeled Treat
× Serve Q3 for men in column 2 and a positive and insignificant coefficient for women in
column 3. In particular, treated men in Serve Q3 were 20.45 percentage points less likely to
respond to the call-to-serve than control men in Serve Q3. Moreover, column 4 reveals the
coefficients on Treat × Serve Q3 are statistically different between men and women.
In summary, we find the Serve Q1 treatment effect is driven by women and the Serve
Q3 effect is driven by men. This finding is consistent with women being more motivated by
below average peer information than men when responding to service calls, and men being
more motivated by above average peer information. Vesterlund et al. (2015) show that
in thinking about accepting the work-related requests, women more than men experience
negative emotions (stress, anxiety, guilt), and worry about the negative repercussions of
declining such request. Our results are congruous with these emotions being exacerbated
if women learn they are behind their peers. However, our findings are also consistent with
social learning, where women in low-serving departments make a Bayesian inference that
they are under-serving relative to their peers, and men in higher serving departments make
a Bayesian inference that they are over-serving and being free-ridden by their peers, since
they could be spending their time in research. We also cannot rule out that women responded
to the treatment in Serve Q1 because treated chairs asked (independently of the call-to-serve
email) female faculty to serve more than men.
An important contribution of our experimental design is that it allows us to look at
gender differences both at baseline (i.e., pre-experiment) and due to the peer comparison
treatment. In particular, our baseline response data allows us to relate our findings to
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previous research analyzing gender differences in standard calls for voluntary service, without
peer comparison interventions. Babcock et al. (2017) examine response data from another
large public university where each year the chair of the academic senate sends a call-to-serve
email to all faculty members asking them to volunteer to serve on a faculty senate committee.
This differs from our setting where the standard call-to-serve email is sent to department
chairs and requests the chairs forward the email to their departments.
Babcock et al. (2017) find that female faculty are significantly more likely than male
faculty to respond to call-to-serve emails saying they would volunteer to be on a committee.
In Table 7, we replicate the Probit model of Babcock et al. (2017) using the 2013-14 baseline
response data (column 1), 2014-15 response data for the control departments (column 2),
and 2014-15 response data for departments receiving the direct email (column 3). Across
all three samples, we do not find that female faculty respond significantly more than male
faculty to the call-to-serve emails. If anything, the coefficients for female faculty are all
negative.
Additionally, the two universities differ in the representation of women in the entire fac-
ulty and on the academic senate committees. In the year of their call-to-serve data, Babcock
et al. (2017) find that women constituted 24.7% of faculty and 37.5% of committee positions.
In our baseline year, women comprised 30.1% of faculty and 32.7% of committee positions.
Thus in the Babcock et al. (2017) sample, women are substantially over-represented on the
committees, while in our sample the gender composition of committees is roughly propor-
tional to the whole faculty.
Unlike the gender differences in treatment effects we find in Table 6, we find no gender
differences in responding at baseline. Furthermore, as also shown in summary Table 3, we
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cannot conclude that women are more likely to serve on committees.15 The fact that our
baseline results counter those of Babcock et al. (2017) indicates that gender differences may
be sensitive to observed factors, such as how the call-to-serve email is sent, and unobserved
factors, such as institutional norms. Institution norms may include faculty beliefs on how
important senate service is for promotion past tenure. Some studies have shown that gender
gaps get smaller when the rewards to a task become larger (Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008;
Petrie and Segal, 2015). The university in our setting emphasizes the importance of service
for promotion in their call-to-serve emails; this may not have been the case in the Babcock
et al. (2017) setting.
The differences in our results may also be reconciled by Croson and Gneezy (2009) and
Jones and Linardi (2014), who find that women are neither more nor less socially oriented,
but that social preferences of women are more situationally specific and malleable than
those of men. Babcock et al. (2017) argue that the mechanism driving women more than
men to receive requests to volunteer and accept requests to volunteer is the expectation
that they are more likely than men to volunteer when someone needs to do so (i.e., women
are more likely to step up to the plate). Since our field experiment provides information
about a department’s relative service and its need for volunteers, the result that women in
the lowest serving departments become more likely to volunteer is consistent with women
in these departments stepping up to the plate more than men when someone needs to take
one for the team (or with chairs asking women more than men to step up to the plate when
15Another difference between Babcock et al. (2017) and this study is the average response rate to the call-to-
serve email. The average pre-experiment response rate at the public university in this study is 8.5%, while
Babcock et al. (2017) find a volunteer response rate of 3.7% at the university in their study.
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there is a need).
In summary, even though we find that social comparisons are effective at increasing
service responses among faculty in the lowest serving departments, these effects are driven
by female faculty responses, be it from the treatment response of individual faculty or chairs.
This was particularly interesting since women and men at this university did not differ in
their response rates to taking on service before the experiment. Our findings suggest that
the information faculty and chairs have about their peers’ service and how faculty are asked
to volunteer could explain some of the gender differences in performing low-promotability
tasks, and consequently, could be an important component in the career trajectory of women
relative to men.
4.3 Heterogeneity in Peer Comparison Treatment Effects by Previous Responses
In Table 8, we examine if the treatment effects vary by whether the faculty member replied
to the call-to-serve in the previous year. We replicate the OLS specification from column
5 of Table 5 separately for the 83 faculty that replied to the 2013-14 call-to-serve (shown
in column 1) and for the 1043 faculty that did not reply (shown in column 2). Faculty in
Serve Q4 are once again excluded from the analysis. In column 1, faculty that replied to the
call-to-serve in the previous year are more likely to respond again if they receive a treatment
email revealing their department is in the lowest service quartile and are less likely to respond
again if the email reveals their department is in the above median service quartile. Faculty
that replied to the call-to-serve in the previous year are also much more likely to respond
again if they receive a direct email, regardless if it is a treatment or control email, as shown
by the large and significant coefficient for Direct Email.
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In column 2, faculty that did not reply to the call-to-serve in the previous year are also
more likely to respond if they receive an email saying their department is in the lowest service
quartile and less likely to respond if revealed to be above median, however, the coefficients
are smaller in magnitude than those in column 1 and are no longer statistically different than
zero. Moreover, unlike in column 1, receiving a direct email does not impact the response of
faculty that did not respond in the previous year. Thus while this experiment was successful
in redistributing serving from high to low service departments, these changes were stronger
for the faculty members who had already engaged in service. If the institution wants to
increase service among those who have not volunteered before, these interventions may not
be desirable.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a first step towards understanding if peer comparisons affect the behavior
of those called to serve on faculty senate committees. We implement a randomized field
experiment at a large public university to examine whether revealing a department’s service
ranking among its peers, in terms of previous service on faculty committees, affects future
response rates of faculty members to calls to serve. We find that revealing a low service
ranking among peers leads to significantly more service responses than disclosing a near-
median service ranking. Yet beyond informing department heads of their departments’
service rank, directly informing individual faculty members does not have an additional
effect on service responses.
In terms of heterogeneous effects by gender, we extend the findings in Babcock et al.
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(2017). While contrary to Babcock et al. (2017), we do not find gender differences in the
response rate to the standard call-to-serve emails pre-experiment, we estimate gender dif-
ferences in the call-to-serve response rate when there is a peer comparison treatment. In
particular, we find that women in departments revealed to be in the lowest service quartile
have a larger percentage point increase in their response rate than their male colleagues,
while men in departments revealed to be above median have a larger percentage point de-
crease in their response rate than their female colleagues. While we cannot rule out that
these treatment effects are driven by the behavior of chairs, rather than individual faculty,
these results imply that information about peer behavior and how women and men are asked
to do low-promotability tasks may have large impacts on career trajectories.
This is the first paper to examine whether responses to calls to serve in university gov-
ernance is influenced by internal service rankings. To make general conclusions about the
determinants of voluntary service, systematic data collection and analysis are required on
volunteer service rates and call-to-serve response rates at other institutions. Future work
could also consider making the department specific disclosed information not only available
to each particular unit, as in this paper’s design, but also available to all units. This could
be done in the form of a disclosed service performance “Top Service” list. Additional investi-
gations could test whether the results are heterogeneous along other dimensions, such as age
or how long someone has worked at the institution. Finally, while the context of this paper
is higher education, the insights can be taken to other settings that suffer from volunteer fa-
tigue. For instance, future work could explore whether peer comparisons redistribute service
loads in non-profit sports clubs, religious organizations, and Parent-Teacher Associations
that rely on member-volunteers to operate. One final step left unanswered is to disentangle
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the mechanisms behind our results. We find that revealing peer ranking increases response
rates but we cannot say exactly why. Future work should identify whether the mechanism
behind the different treatment effects is due to differences in pro-social behavior or whether
it is due to differences in the ability to process and say no to calls to serve in low-promotion
tasks.
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Table 1: Service Participation Summary Statistics by Department Size Quartile
Size Q1 Size Q2 Size Q3 Size Q4
Number of Faculty in Department up to 9.5 up to 16 up to 27.5 up to 80.5
Number of Service Eligible Faculty in Department [2.5,7.5] (7.5,12] (12,24.5] (24.5,72.5]
Number of Departments 13 19 15 17
Average Service Eligible Participation in 2013-14 26.03% 32.51% 27.14% 22.85%
Median Service Eligible Participation in 2013-14 16.67% 31.58% 24.32% 24.24%
Maximum Service Eligible Participation in 2013-14 75.00% 75.00% 57.73% 33.71%
Size Q1 is comprised of the smallest departments—25th percentile or lower with respect to the number of service
eligible faculty—and Size Q4 is comprised of the largest departments—75th percentile or higher with respect to the
number of service eligible faculty. The service eligible pool consists of faculty that are Associate Professors or higher.
Source: Faculty 2013-14 census roster by department.
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Table 2: Number of Departments in the Treatment and Control
Groups, by Service Participation Quartile and Size Quartile
Serve Q1 Serve Q2 Serve Q3 Serve Q4
control treat control treat control treat no treat
Size Q1 1 4 0 0 4 0 4
Size Q2 1 3 3 3 2 2 5
Size Q3 2 2 1 2 3 2 3
Size Q4 3 2 2 2 2 2 4
Serve Q1 is the lowest 25th percentile of departments and Serve Q4 is the 75th or
higher percentile of departments with respect to pre-treatment service participation
rates (among departments of the same size). Size Q1 is comprised of the smallest
departments (25th percentile or lower) and Size Q4 is comprised of the largest
departments (75th percentile or higher), with respect to the number of service eligible
faculty.
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Table 3: Sample Characteristics, For All Departments and by Service Quartile and Treatment Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Serve Q1 Serve Q2 Serve Q3 Serve Q4 Chair Email Faculty Email
control treat control treat
Number of:
Departments 64 18 13 17 16 18 18 6 6
Faculty 1501 420 385 321 375 455 470 117 84
2013-14 Department Averages:
Number of Faculty 23.45 23.33 29.62 18.88 23.44 25.28 26.11 19.50 14.00
(18.60) (19.71) (21.51) (12.42) (20.53) (21.17) (19.09) (12.18) (4.47)
Female Share of Faculty 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.36
(0.19) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) (0.19) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18)
Share Replied to Serve 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.04
(0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Female Share Replied to Serve 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.04
(0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10)
Male Share Replied to Serve 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.05
(0.13) (0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Share Serving 0.18 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.05
(0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04)
Share Women Serving 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.04
(0.20) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.26) (0.11) (0.15) (0.20) (0.10)
Share Men Serving 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.06
(0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.19) (0.09) (0.13) (0.05)
Trend in Service Participation:
2005–2014 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Trend in Women Percentage:
2008–2014 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Standard deviations are in parentheses, except in the bottom row which presents the standard errors for the trend in service participation. Serve Q1 is
the lowest quartile of departments with respect to pre-treatment service participation (among departments of the same size) and Serve Q4 is the highest
quartile of departments. Bold text in columns 2 to 4 indicates the average for the Serve Q1, Q2, and Q3 departments is statistically different (with
a p-value ≤ 0.10) from the average for the Serve Q4 departments. Bold text in column 6 and 8 indicates the average for the treated departments is
statistically different (with a p-value ≤ 0.05) from the average for the corresponding control departments in columns 7 and 9. Italics text in all columns
indicates the average for male faculty is statistically different (p-value ≤ 0.05) from the average for female faculty.
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Table 4: Call-to-Serve Responses for 2014-15
Replied for Did not reply for
2014-15 2014-15
Chair Only Email
Treated (N=470) 74 16% 396 84%
Control (N=455) 58 13% 397 87%
Direct Faculty Email
Treated (N=84) 19 23% 65 77%
Control (N=117) 22 19% 95 81%
Serve Q1
Treated (N=198) 37 19% 161 81%
Control (N=222) 20 9% 202 91%
Serve Q2
Treated (N=227) 35 16% 183 84%
Control (N=167) 30 18% 137 82%
Serve Q3
Treated (N=138) 21 15% 117 85%
Control (N=183) 30 16% 153 84%
Male Faculty
Treated (N=407) 72 18% 335 82%
Control (N=394) 57 14% 337 86%
Female Faculty
Treated (N=147) 21 14% 126 86%
Control (N=178) 23 13% 155 87%
Did Not Respond to Call in 2013-14
Treated (N=520) 75 14% 445 86%
Control (N=523) 55 11% 468 89%
Responded to Call in 2013-14
Treated (N=34) 18 53% 16 47%
Control (N=49) 25 51% 24 49%
Source: 2014-15 call-to-serve reply database. Note: This table reports the number
and share of 2014-15 call-to-serve responses by treatment and control group and by
pre-treatment service quartile. Serve Q1 is the lowest quartile of departments with
respect to pre-treatment service participation (among departments of the same size)
and Serve Q4 is the highest quartile of departments. The 16 departments in the
highest serving quartile (Serve Q4 ) are excluded from the control group in the top
half of the table.
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Figure 1: Share of Treatment and Control Department Faculty Responding to the
Call-to-Serve for 2013-14 (pre-treatment) and for 2014-15 (post-treament)






























































Share Responding to Call (2013)
Source: 2013-14 and 2014-15 call-to-serve reply database. Note: Control departments depicted in blue. Treated departments
depicted in red. Circle size corresponds to the size of each department.
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Figure 2: Share of Faculty Responding to the Call-to-Serve Email and Serving on
a Committee, for All Departments and by Pre-Treatment Service Quartile
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All Depts Serve Q1 Serve Q2 Serve Q3 Serve Q4
2013-14 2014-15
Source: 2013-14 and 2014-15 call-to-serve service database. Note: The pre-treatment year is 2013-14 and the treatment year is
2014-15. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 5: Average Treatment Effects and Heterogeneity by Service Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit wspace
Treat 0.0351 0.1515 0.0310 0.1376 0.1138∗ 0.5328∗
(0.0278) (0.1170) (0.0319) (0.1400) (0.0568) (0.2741)
Direct Email 0.0385 0.1686 0.0104 0.1259
(0.0290) (0.1231) (0.0560) (0.2760)
Treat × Direct 0.0519 0.1979 0.0527 0.1980
(0.0501) (0.2042) (0.0891) (0.3994)
Treat × Serve Q2 -0.1301∗ -0.6002∗∗
(0.0649) (0.3022)
Treat × Serve Q3 -0.1434∗∗ -0.6664∗∗
(0.0701) (0.3233)
Direct × Serve Q2 -0.0185 -0.1601
(0.0605) (0.2892)
Direct × Serve Q3 0.0874 0.2636
(0.0705) (0.3456)
Treat × Direct × Serve Q2 -0.0601 -0.2204
(0.0991) (0.4338)
Treat × Direct × Serve Q3 0.0620 0.1863
(0.0970) (0.4312)
Constant 0.1077 -1.2234∗∗∗ 0.0636 -1.4448∗∗∗ 0.0045 -1.7888∗∗∗
(0.0831) (0.3751) (0.0642) (0.3263) (0.0752) (0.4010)
N 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126
Service × Size Interactions X X X X X X
R-sq 0.0119 0.0155 0.0246
LL -442.4704 -476.1165 -440.4499 -474.1369 -435.2249 -468.7185
Dependent variable in all columns is equal to one if the faculty member responded to the call-to-serve for 2014-15 and equal to zero
otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the department level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Odd-numbered
columns have the estimates from a linear regression, while even numbered columns have the estimates from a Probit regression.
Serve Q1 is the lowest quartile of departments with respect to pre-treatment service participation (among departments of the same
size) and Serve Q4 is the highest quartile of departments. Faculty in untreated Serve Q4 departments are not included in this
analysis. Serve Q1 is the reference (omitted) category in all columns. Though not reported in the table, regressions in columns 5
and 6 include all size and service participation quartile dummies and their lower order interactions.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects by Gender (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample, Fully
Whole Sample Male Sample Female Sample Interacted by Gender
Treat 0.1129∗∗ 0.1018 0.1541∗∗∗ 0.1541∗∗∗
(0.0539) (0.0752) (0.0410) (0.0403)
Direct Email 0.0126 -0.0048 0.1096 0.1096
(0.0553) (0.0685) (0.0727) (0.0716)
Treat × Direct 0.0552 0.1009 -0.0624 -0.0624
(0.0884) (0.1143) (0.0770) (0.0759)
Treat × Serve Q2 -0.1334∗∗ -0.1071 -0.2313∗∗∗ -0.2313∗∗∗
(0.0617) (0.0862) (0.0576) (0.0568)
Treat × Serve Q3 -0.1438∗∗ -0.2045∗∗ 0.0665 0.0665
(0.0674) (0.0904) (0.0768) (0.0757)
Direct × Serve Q2 -0.0247 -0.0641 0.0418 0.0418
(0.0599) (0.0808) (0.1179) (0.1162)
Direct × Serve Q3 0.0863 0.1592∗ -0.0655 -0.0655
(0.0694) (0.0836) (0.1067) (0.1051)
Treat × Direct × Serve Q2 -0.0645 -0.0653 -0.1662 -0.1662
(0.0977) (0.1341) (0.1297) (0.1278)
Treat × Direct × Serve Q3 0.0518 0.0777 -0.1077 -0.1077
(0.0958) (0.1262) (0.1045) (0.1029)
Male 0.0327 0.2078∗∗∗
(0.0270) (0.0760)
Treat × Male -0.0524
(0.0709)
Direct Email × Male -0.1144
(0.0902)
Treat × Direct × Male 0.1633∗
(0.0880)
Treat × Serve Q2 × Male 0.1242
(0.0959)
Treat × Serve Q3 × Male -0.2711∗∗∗
(0.0977)
Direct × Serve Q2 × Male -0.1059
(0.1536)
Direct × Serve Q3 × Male 0.2248∗
(0.1245)
Treat × Direct × Serve Q2 × Male 0.1009
(0.1785)
Treat × Direct × Serve Q3 × Male 0.1853
(0.1248)
Constant -0.0145 0.0846 -0.1231∗∗ -0.1231∗∗
(0.0725) (0.0948) (0.0580) (0.0573)
N 1126 801 325 1126
Service × Size Interactions X X X
Service × Size × Male Interactions X
R-sq 0.0246 0.0405 0.0824 0.0524
Dependent variable in all columns is equal to one if the faculty member responded to the call-to-serve for 2014-15 and equal to zero
otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the department level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Serve Q1 is the
lowest quartile of departments with respect to pre-treatment service participation (among departments of the same size) and Serve Q4
is the highest quartile of departments. Faculty in untreated Serve Q4 departments are not included in this analysis. Serve Q1 is the
reference (omitted) category in both columns. Though not reported in the table, regressions include all size and service participation
quartile dummies and their lower order interactions.
41





All Depts Depts Depts
Female -0.0164 -0.0291 -0.0529
(0.0149) (0.0254) (0.0583)
Associate Professor 0.1436∗∗∗ 0.0708 0.3158∗∗
(0.0501) (0.0517) (0.1443)
Full Professor 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗ 0.1562∗
(0.0223) (0.0345) (0.0861)
STEM -0.0180 -0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0259
(0.0144) (0.0246) (0.0573)
N 1501 830 117
ll -425.8559 -329.4450 -97.9967
This table replicates Table 1 in Babcock et al. (2017) using data from
our study’s faculty census matched to data from our 2013-14 and 2014-15
call-to-serve reply database. This table presents marginal effects from a
Probit regression. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is equal to one if the faculty member replied to the call-to-serve
and equal to zero otherwise. Column 1 includes response data for 2013-
14 (pre-treatment) from all departments, column 2 includes data from
the un-treated department in 2014-15, and column 3 includes data from
direct email departments in 2014-15.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects by Previous Re-
sponses to the Call-to-Serve (OLS)
(1) (2)
Did Not
Served in 2013-14 Serve in 2013-14
Treat 0.3125∗∗∗ 0.0984
(0.1002) (0.0614)
Direct Email 0.8750∗∗∗ -0.0425
(0.1009) (0.0522)
Treat × Direct -0.1875 0.0975
(0.1879) (0.0830)
Treat × Serve Q2 -0.1724 -0.1236∗
(0.1687) (0.0664)
Treat × Serve Q3 -0.4635∗∗ -0.0685
(0.1841) (0.0692)
Direct × Serve Q2 -0.3960∗ 0.0324
(0.2295) (0.0550)
Direct × Serve Q3 0.0998 0.0160
(0.1072) (0.0725)
Treat × Direct × Serve Q2 -0.0374 -0.1202
(0.2425) (0.0876)





Service × Size Interactions X X
R-sq 0.3407 0.0227
Dependent variable in all columns is equal to one if the faculty member responded
to the call-to-serve for 2014-15 and equal to zero otherwise. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the department level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Serve Q1 is the lowest quartile of departments with respect to
pre-treatment service participation (among departments of the same size) and
Serve Q4 is the highest quartile of departments. Faculty in untreated Serve
Q4 departments are not included in this analysis. Serve Q1 is the reference
(omitted) category in both columns. Though not reported in the table, regressions
include all size and service participation quartile dummies and their lower order
interactions.
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Figure Appendix.1: Emails sent to Chairs and to All Senate Members
===BEGIN CHAIR EMAIL:    
Dear Chair (Dean) XXX, 
We would like to thank your department for its ongoing participation in the activities of the [University’s] 
Academic Senate. [The committee that recruits service] will soon begin to recommend faculty for service 
on the [Academic Senate]. [The University’s] principle of shared governance contributes importantly to 
the excellence of this [university]. Shared governance depends, however, on the willingness of faculty to 
exercise it. There are two other, more concrete reasons why it is in the interest of your faculty to 
undertake Academic Senate service. First, such service gives your department a place at the table and 
assures that its interests are represented in decisions affecting our lives as teachers, researchers, and 
employees. Second, as the [Academic Senate and Administration] have forcefully emphasized, 
participation in Academic Senate and administrative committees is an important consideration in 
advancement and promotion, especially after tenure is received. 
==Only for Treatment Departments==After reviewing the service participation data for 64 campus units, 
we have noted that your department is in the bottom 25% when compared to other units of similar size.  
Please forward this message to your faculty to encourage them to submit their committee preferences 
directly. They can sign up by following this link:<<LINK HERE>> 
Once again, we would be very grateful if you would encourage your colleagues to respond. Thank you 
again for your continued support of the [University’s] Academic Senate! 
===END OF EMAIL 
 
===BEGIN DIRECT FACULTY EMAIL:   
Dear Colleague, 
This is a reminder for you to respond to the call to serve. [The committee that recruits service] will soon 
begin to recommend faculty for service on the [Academic Senate], and I invite you to serve. [The 
University’s] principle of shared governance contributes importantly to the excellence of this campus 
and university. Shared governance depends, however, on the willingness of faculty to exercise it. 
There are two other, more concrete reasons why it is in your interest to undertake Academic Senate 
service. First, such service gives your department a place at the table and assures that its interests are 
represented in decisions affecting our lives as teachers, researchers, and employees. Second, as the 
[Academic Senate and Administration] have forcefully emphasized, participation in Academic Senate and 
administrative committees is an important consideration in advancement and promotion, especially after 
tenure is received.   
==Only for Treatment Departments==After reviewing the service participation data for 64 campus units, 
we have noted that your department is in the bottom 25% when compared to other units of similar size.  
We would therefore like to encourage you to submit your committee preferences directly. You can sign 
up by following this link: <<<LINK HERE>>> 
Thank you again for your continued support of the [University’s] Academic Senate! 
===END OF EMAIL 
Note: Edited Chair Email and Faculty Email are provided here. Treated departments receive the entire email content.
Control departments do not receive text marked in blue.
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